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A considerable amount has been written about the privacy implications of publishing 
court and tribunal records online. In this article the authors examine the linkages between 
privacy and vulnerability for members of marginalized communities and, drawing on 
Calo’s “vicious cycle” of privacy and vulnerability, suggest that publicly accessible online 
court records represent an equality issue as well. Drawing on social science research 
and privacy theory, the authors demonstrate the potentially disproportionate effect of 
online court records on members of marginalized communities. They then examine 
Canadian case law, legislation and policy that impose restrictions on public disclosure 
of information from court proceedings and disclosure of information within court 
proceedings to highlight a limited pre-existing recognition of the privacy/vulnerability 
cycle. In conclusion they suggest that removal of personal information from court records 
made publicly available online would serve to protect both privacy and equality rights. 
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Ryan Calo1
1. Ryan Calo, “Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance” (2017) 66:2 DePaul 
Law Review 591 at 597.
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I. Introduction 
Court and tribunal records from around the world are increasingly publicly accessible online. These initiatives offer, as we and others 
have noted, ground-shifting opportunities for improved access to 
justice and for the transparency of court proceedings; however, they 
simultaneously raise serious privacy issues for those involved, willingly 
or unwillingly, in those proceedings.2 In this article we explore the 
complex and iterative relationship, characterized in the epigraph by 
Calo, between publicly accessible, unredacted, online court records and 
marginalization, vulnerability and inequality. Specifically, we suggest that 
members of equality-seeking communities stand to be disproportionately 
negatively affected by online publication of court records incorporating 
personal information. In this way, online court records constitute not 
only a privacy problem, but an equality problem as well. This further 
dimension adds urgency to the need for privacy and equality-respecting 
approaches to online publication of court and tribunal records.
We advance our argument in Parts II and III. Part II examines 
literature and social science evidence relating to privacy and vulnerability, 
suggesting that members of marginalized communities in Canada, 
including poor and homeless persons, those suffering from mental illness, 
racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples, will be disproportionately 
negatively affected by publicly accessible online court records. Drawing 
on Calo’s “vicious cycle” analogy, we offer three reasons in support of 
this assertion: (i) members of certain marginalized communities are 
over-represented in many types of court proceedings; (ii) the impacts 
of marginalization may force members of these communities to engage 
with the justice system; and (iii) potentially stigmatizing information 
2. Jane Bailey & Jacquelyn Burkell, “Revisiting the Open Court Principle 
in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access 
to Parties’ and Witnesses’ Personal Information” (2017) 48:1 Ottawa 
Law Review 147; Natalie A MacDonnell, “Disability Disclosure in the 
Digital Age: Why the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Should Reform 
its Approach to Anonymized Decisions” (2016) 25:1 Journal of Law and 
Social Policy 109; Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, 
Ethics and Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 5. 
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about these individuals in court records renders them vulnerable to 
increased discrimination and other kinds of harms. Part III looks at 
the degree to which Canadian law has recognized and responded to 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle in relation to court and tribunal records. 
After examining court rulings about publication bans and rules relating 
to disclosure within proceedings, this section specifically examines 
privacy protections afforded to certain vulnerable groups, including 
children, sexual assault complainants (who are disproportionately 
likely to be women) and persons with disabilities, as well as public 
commentary relating to online publication of court records.  Some of 
these decisions and commentators implicitly or explicitly recognize the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle that connects a lack of privacy with exposure 
to inequality and discrimination, thereby offering at least some analysis 
that can be used to support removing personal information from publicly 
accessible online court records. The conclusion recommends a response 
that disrupts the “vicious cycle” without presuming or suggesting that 
members of equality-seeking communities must or ought to conceal 
certain information about themselves.
II. Examination of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle 
in the Literature 
Jeffrey Rosen, in The Unwanted Gaze, noted that “[t]he ideal of privacy 
… insists that individuals should be allowed to define themselves, and 
to decide how much of themselves to reveal or conceal in different 
situations”.3 Rosen’s remarks are echoed in Nissenbaum’s concept of 
information privacy as “contextual integrity”.4 According to Nissenbaum, 
privacy violations occur when personal information is used in ways 
that are incompatible with norms of appropriate use and appropriate 
distribution.5 The ability to control the use and dissemination of 
3. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2000) at 223. 
4. Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 79:1 
Washington Law Review 119.
5. Ibid at 125.
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information about oneself is important. Intimate relationships depend 
on a delicate interplay between concealment and disclosure.6 Privacy 
offers us personal autonomy, and supports important social values 
including democracy.7 While it can and has been used to shield abuse of 
members of equality-seeking groups from public scrutiny and censure,8 
it can also afford members of equality-seeking groups, including women, 
opportunities for “replenishing solitude and independent decision 
making,” as well as freedom from censure, surveillance and pressures of 
conformity.9 Everyone, including members of equality-seeking groups, 
needs – and deserves – privacy. 
A. Privacy and Vulnerability
Nonetheless, there are many cases in which privacy is closely, and 
negatively, tied to vulnerability and marginalization. Economic 
marginalization and lack of privacy go hand in hand. Some have argued 
that privacy is becoming a “luxury good”,10 available primarily to those 
who can afford to pay to achieve it.11 This is particularly true online, 
where ‘free’ services are in fact purchased with the currency of personal 
information, and the price of freedom from online surveillance is paid in 
cash – either by use of services hidden behind “paywalls”, or through the 
purchase of privacy-protecting technologies and software. Those living in 
6. Sandra Petronio & Irwin Altman, Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of 
Disclosure (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
7. Nissenbaum, supra note 4 at 128-29.
8. Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989) at 191.
9. Anita L Allen, “Still Uneasy: Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace” (2000) 
52:5 Stanford Law Review 1175 at 1179. See also Patricia J Williams, The 
Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991) at 164-65.
10. Julia Angwin, “Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?” The New York Times 
(3 March 2014), online: NY Times <www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/
opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html>.
11. Michael Rosenberg, “The Price of Privacy: How Access to Digital Privacy 
is Slowly Becoming Divided by Class” (2016) 20:1 UCLA Journal of Law 
and Technology 1.
6 
 
Burkell & Bailey, Equity at Stake
poverty can afford neither, and as a result cannot benefit from the privacy 
protection that these purchases support. In the United States, many have 
argued that Fourth Amendment protection is reduced for the poor,12 
specifically because they are less able to afford to buy homes.13 Although 
the issue has not been widely addressed in Canada, some empirical 
research suggests that homeless people’s contacts with law often involve 
invasion of their section 8 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.14 These individuals are vulnerable to arbitrary search and 
seizure because they lack a prototypical ‘home’ within which they would 
be presumed to have an expectation of privacy. Technological advances 
in surveillance may further erode the privacy of those living in poverty.15 
GPS tracking technologies, for example, are more easily deployed against 
the urban poor, since their vehicles are more likely than those of wealthier 
citizens to be parked in a public location and thus be accessible for the 
placement of the devices.16 Poverty, then, leads to conditions in which 
12. John Berry, “Nowhere to Hide: How the Judiciary’s Acceptance of 
Warrantless GPS Tracking Eliminates the Practical and Legal Privacy 
Enjoyed by the Poor” Social Science Research Network (2011), online: 
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949387>; Christopher Slobogin, “The 
Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment” (2003) 55:1 Florida Law 
Review 391; Kami Chavis Simmons, “Future of the Fourth Amendment: 
The Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing” (2014) 14:2 University 
of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class 240.
13. See Justin Stec, “Why the Homeless are Denied Personhood Under the 
Law: Toward Contextualizing the Reasonableness Standard in Search and 
Seizure Jurisprudence” (2006) 3:2 Rutgers Journal of Law & Urban Policy 
321; Mark A Godsey, “Privacy and the Growing Plight of the Homeless: 
Reconsidering the Values Underlying the Fourth Amendment” (1992) 
53:3 Ohio State Law Journal 869.
14. Carol Kauppi & Henri Pallard, “Homeless People and the Police: 
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, and Arbitrary Detentions and 
Arrests” (2009) 1:6 Conference of the International Journal of Arts and 
Sciences 344, online: Open Access Library <openaccesslibrary.org/images/
MAL231_Henri_Pallard.pdf>.
15. Amelia L Diedrich, “Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the 
Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment” (2011) 
39:1 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 297.
16. Berry, supra note 12.
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privacy is more difficult to attain, or easier to invade.
The privacy of members of vulnerable communities can be, and 
is, compromised by surveillance directed toward those communities. 
Surveillance of welfare recipients has in some cases been justified on the 
basis that they are receiving assistance from the state,17 but others have 
argued that this surveillance most significantly affects single, racialized 
mothers.18 In the United States, many jurisdictions require welfare 
recipients to undergo government mandated drug testing.19 Techniques 
of public health screening and surveillance are also selectively directed 
towards vulnerable members of society. One example is a drug-screening 
program for pregnant women, enacted by the Medical University of 
South Carolina in the late 1980’s.20 The program, designed to reduce 
the impact of prenatal cocaine use on fetuses, was directed specifically 
toward women who had not obtained prenatal care and those with a 
previous history of drug or alcohol abuse. If the woman tested positive, 
the results were turned over to the police, and the woman was threatened 
with prosecution in order to force her into treatment. A great deal has 
been written about the legality of the program, along with analyses of 
the US Supreme Court decision that determined that the testing violated 
17. Mike Dee, “Welfare Surveillance, Income Management and New 
Paternalism in Australia” (2013) 11:3 Surveillance & Society 272; Krystle 
Maki “Neoliberal Deviants and Surveillance: Welfare Recipients Under 
the Watchful Eye of Ontario Works” (2011) 9:1/2 Surveillance & Society 
47; Paul Henman & Greg Marston, “The Social Division of Welfare 
Surveillance” (2008) 37:2 Journal of Social Policy 187.
18. John Gilliom, The Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the 
Limits of Privacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
19. Celia Goetzl, “Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare 
Recipients: Special Need or Unconstitutional Condition?” (2013) 15:5 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1539.
20. Lawrence O Gostin, “The Rights of Pregnant Women: The Supreme 
Court and Drug Testing” (2001) 31:5 Hastings Centre Report 8. See 
also Kristina B Wolff, “Panic in the ER: Maternal Drug Use, the Right to 
Bodily Integrity, Privacy, and Informed Consent” (2011) 39:5 Politics & 
Policy 679.
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Fourth Amendment rights.21 For our purposes, however, the fact that 
this program was ruled unconstitutional is less relevant than the fact 
that the testing, and the negative effects emanating from it, were highly 
discriminatory, affecting primarily low-income and racialized women. 
This is just one of many examples where surveillance is directed at 
vulnerable populations, with predictable and often negative results. 
There exist myriad examples of selective use of privacy-compromising 
technologies by police against members of marginalized communities. In 
Canada, DNA technology and “voluntary” DNA collection programs 
have been deployed in the context of law enforcement initiatives relating 
to violence against Indigenous women and girls. These include an initiative 
involving the collection of DNA and other personal information from 
women (often Indigenous women) engaged in what have been termed 
“vulnerable lifestyles”, as well as an initiative involving the collection of 
DNA from men living in a remote First Nations community that was 
the site of the violent death of a young girl.22 Police stops of racialized 
youth, particularly young men, are so common that the phrase “driving 
while black” has become part of the public lexicon.23 For example, recent 
data from Ottawa indicate that police there are disproportionately likely 
to target Middle Eastern and black drivers for “random” traffic stops.24
21. See e.g. Andrew E Taslitz, “A Feminist Fourth Amendment? Consent, 
Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston” 
(2002) 9:1 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1.
22. Jane Bailey & Sara Shayan, “Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women 
Crisis: Technological Dimensions” (2016) 28:2 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 321.
23. David A Harris, “The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why ‘Driving 
While Black’ Matters” (1999) 84:2 Minnesota Law Review 265.
24. Ontario Human Rights Commission, OHRC Response to the Race Data 
and Traffic Stops in Ottawa Report, (Ontario: OHRC, 18 November 
2016), online: OHRC <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-response-race-data-
and-traffic-stops-ottawa-report>; Lorne Foster, Les Jacobs & Bobby Siu, 
“Race Data and Traffic Stops in Ottawa, 2013-2015: A Report on Ottawa 
and the Police Districts” (Ottawa Police Services Board and Ottawa 
Police Service, October 2016) at 3 online: Ottawa Police <https://www.
ottawapolice.ca/en/about-us/resources/.TSRDCP_York_Research_Report.
pdf>. 
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Not only do conditions of marginalization – e.g. poverty – make 
people more vulnerable to privacy intrusions; privacy intrusions have 
the potential to increase the effects of marginalization. As Kimberly 
Bailey points out, “because privacy makes an individual less vulnerable 
to oppressive state social control, the deprivation of privacy can be an 
important aspect of one’s subordination”.25 Michele Estrin Gilman 
makes a similar point about the impact of privacy intrusions (in this case, 
on the poor), suggesting that “the poor as a group suffer extreme privacy 
violations, which in turn pose a barrier to self-sufficiency and democratic 
participation”.26
Privacy violations can increase marginalization by signaling that 
the victims lack social standing or somehow deserve the intrusion.27 The 
widespread practice of “carding”, for example, signals to others that those 
stopped by police might be dangerous, thus potentially altering attitudes 
and behavior toward them. Increased surveillance – and the lack of privacy 
that it entails – increases the risk that some wrongdoing will be identified. 
Paul Henman and Greg Marston, for example, discuss the “risk logic” 
of compliance activities in the Australian social security system.28 That 
system uses statistical profiling to identify clients who share characteristics 
with those who have in the past “been incorrectly paid” (read: committed 
welfare fraud). Even though individuals identified as having these 
characteristics may never themselves have “been incorrectly paid,”  they 
are subjected, by virtue of their statistical resemblance to the group who 
have, to increased surveillance – which, by its very nature, increases the 
likelihood that “incorrect payments” will be identified. The system is a 
self-reinforcing feedback loop that creates an underclass within the larger 
25. Kimberly D Bailey, “Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the 
State” (2014) 47:5 UC Davis Law Review 1539 at 1542.
26. Michele Estrin Gilman, “The Class Differential in Privacy Law” (2012) 
77:4 Brooklyn Law Review 1389 at 1395.
27. See Craig Konnoth, “An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions” (2017) 
102:4 Iowa Law Review 1533 for a discussion of this point. See also 
Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “‘The Crime of Survival’: Fraud Prosecutions, 
Community Surveillance and the Original ‘Welfare Queen’” (2007) 41:2 
Journal of Social History 329.  
28. Henman & Marston, supra note 17 at 200.
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(and vulnerable) group of those receiving social benefits from the state. 
Jessica Roberts explicitly ties a lack of privacy to discrimination, noting 
that “[u]nlawful discrimination … frequently requires discriminators 
to have knowledge about protected status”.29 Roberts’ analysis suggests 
that privacy may be important to prevent discrimination.30 While we do 
not believe that privacy protections could or should supplant equality-
based anti-discrimination measures and education, in a context in which 
identifiability as a member of particular marginalized communities is the 
basis for discrimination, it seems logical to suggest that privacy intrusions 
have the potential to foster discriminatory practices and thus privacy 
protection could help to reduce discrimination. 
B. Connecting the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle to Court 
Records
Calo identifies the relationship between privacy and vulnerability as a 
“circle” or “cycle”: “the more vulnerable a person is, the less privacy they 
tend to enjoy; meanwhile, a lack of privacy opens the door to greater 
vulnerability and exploitation”.31 In the remainder of this paper, we 
explore one version of this “vicious cycle”, examining the links between 
privacy, vulnerability, and the open (and increasingly online) publication 
of court records. 
We have argued elsewhere that although public access to court records 
is consistent with the open court principle, which supports transparency of 
court proceedings, public access to unredacted court records, particularly 
if placed online, presents significant and unwarranted privacy risks to 
those involved in court processes.32 These files often contain information 
that is deeply personal and potentially very sensitive, including identifying 
information, financial information, details about relationships, and 
29. Jessica L Roberts, “Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination” (2015) 
56:6 William and Mary Law Review 2097 at 2097. 
30. Ibid at 2101.
31. Calo, supra note 1 at 591.
32. Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2. 
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details about health status.33 The release of this information exposes 
litigants, witnesses and others identified in the court processes to a variety 
of risks, including identity theft and extortion.34 Those identified in the 
records can suffer dignity harms when highly personal information such 
as the details of a marital breakdown become publicly available.35 When 
the information in the records includes details about protected status, 
there is also the risk of discrimination.36 
Members of marginalized communities stand to suffer the most 
significant privacy harms from open court records that include names 
along with a vast array of other identifying, and often highly personal, 
information. In the following section, we identify three bases for this 
argument: first, members of marginalized communities are over-
represented in many kinds of court proceedings; second, in order to 
contest (and potentially redress) the impact of marginalization, members 
of these communities are forced to engage with the justice system; 
third, the potentially stigmatizing information that is revealed about 
these individuals in court records leaves them vulnerable to increased 
discrimination and other harms. 
1. Vulnerable Populations Over-Represented in Court 
Proceedings
Members of equality-seeking groups bear a larger privacy burden related 
to open court records to the extent that they are over-represented among 
those identified in those court records. Few statistics exist to document 
the demographic characteristics of individuals involved in the court 
system as defendants or parties, and even less evidence exists with respect 
33. Peter A Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability 
and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information” (2004) 79:1 Washington 
Law Review 307; Sujoy Chatterjee, “Balancing Privacy and the Open 
Court Principle in Family Law: Does De-Identifying Case Law Protect 
Anonymity?” (2014) 23:1 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 9; Bailey & 
Burkell, ibid at 148.
34. Bailey & Burkell, ibid at 175.
35. Chatterjee, supra note 33 at 97.
36. Roberts, supra note 29 at 2101.
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to witnesses and others (e.g. children in family court cases) who are 
discussed in court proceedings. Nonetheless, analysis of involvement 
with the criminal justice system and examination of factors related to 
child protection issues and the incidence of justiciable problems strongly 
suggests that members of equality-seeking groups are likely to be over-
represented in court records.
Involvement with the criminal justice system is correlated with 
a range of overlapping marginalizing conditions. There is widespread 
recognition of the negative correlation between socioeconomic status 
and involvement with the criminal justice system: those lower on the 
socioeconomic scale are over-represented in the system.37 The limited body 
of research on the relationship between homelessness and the criminal 
justice system suggests that homeless individuals, including street-
involved youth, are at an increased risk of involvement with the criminal 
justice system.38 A 2002 report on homeless individuals in Calgary, for 
example, indicated that over three-quarters had at some point in their 
lives been incarcerated,39 and homelessness and incarceration have a 
reciprocal relationship: homelessness increases the risk of incarceration, 
37. Ruth R Kipping et al, “Multiple Risk Behaviour in Adolescence and 
Socio-Economic Status: Findings from a UK Birth Cohort” (2015) 25:1 
European Journal of Public Health 44.
38. Sylvia Novac et al, “Justice and Injustice: Homelessness, Crime, 
Victimization, and the Criminal Justice System” (2006) Centre for 
Urban and Community Studies, online: University of Toronto <www.
urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/researchprojects/Novacet-al-207-
JusticeHomeless2006.pdf>; Employment and Social Development 
Canada, “Mental Health Courts: Processes, Outcomes and Impact on 
Homelessness” by Sue-Ann MacDonald et al, (Montreal: Université de 
Montreal, May 2014), online: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness 
<www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/ HKDFinalReport_2014.pdf >.
39. Helen Gardiner & Kathleen Cairns, “2002 Calgary Homelessness Study” 
Calgary Homeless Foundation (October 2002) at 46, online: CHF <http://
homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Calgary%20 Homelessness%20
Study%202002.pdf>.
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which is in turn associated with higher rates of homelessness.40 Among 
women who have been incarcerated, poverty is strongly associated with 
recidivism, and thus involvement anew in criminal justice proceedings.41 
In the United States, race is strongly associated with arrest history, 
particularly for males, with black males having a much higher probability 
of arrest record than any other group.42 Canadian data show a similar 
picture, indicating that black inmates are over-represented in the 
incarcerated population.43 In Canada, a similar situation exists with 
respect to the Indigenous population. Indigenous people make up 
4.3% of the general population, but 24.6% of the inmate population.44 
Indigenous women are even more over-represented, comprising 35% 
of federal prison inmates, and are Canada’s fastest growing prison 
population.45 Gender non-conforming youth, and particularly youth 
identifying as transgender, are more likely to be involved with the youth 
40. “Criminal Justice, Homelessness & Health” National Healthcare for the 
Homeless Council (2011) online: NHCHC <www.nhchc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/09/CriminalJustice2011_final.pdf>.
41. Kristy Holtfreter, Michael D Reisig & Merry Morash, “Poverty, State 
Capital, and Recidivism Among Women Offenders” (2004) 3:2 
Criminology & Public Policy 185.
42. Robert Brame et al, “Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest 
Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23” (2014) 60:3 Crime & Delinquency 471.
43. As of 2015, the “federal incarceration rate for Blacks [was] three times 
their representation in Canadian society”. See Canada, Office of the 
Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator 2014-2015, by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: OCI, 26 June, 2015), 
online: OCI <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.
aspx>.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.  
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criminal justice system.46
In a 2012 report, the Mental Health Commission of Canada47 noted 
the over-representation in the criminal justice system of those living 
with mental health issues; this issue may be particularly acute among 
youth.48 This over-representation, also observed in the United States, has 
been attributed in large part to deinstitutionalization.49 Although there 
is growing recognition that mental illness is unfairly criminalized in 
Canada,50 programs designed to divert those with mental illness before they 
are charged (police-based diversion programs) are of limited effectiveness 
given the lack of treatment options for those living with mental illness.51 
Persons with intellectual disabilities are also over-represented in the 
criminal justice system,52 in part as a result of their lack of understanding 
46. Angela Irvine, “We’ve Had Three of Them: Addressing the Invisibility 
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Gender Nonconforming Youths in the 
Juvenile Justice System” (2010) 19:3 Columbia Journal of Gender 
and Law 675; Jerome Hunt & Aisha C Moodie-Mills, “The Unfair 
Criminalization of Gay and Transgender Youth: An Overview of 
the Experiences of LGBT Youth in the Juvenile Justice System” 
Center for American Progress (29 June 2012), online: Center for 
American Progress  <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/
reports/2012/06/29/11730/the-unfair-criminalization-of-gay-and-
transgender-youth/>.
47. Mental Health Commission of Canada, Changing Directions, Changing 
Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada (Calgary: MHCC, 2012), 
online: MHCC <strategy.mentalhealthcommission.ca/pdf/strategy-
images-en.pdf>.
48. Michele Peterson-Badali et al, “Mental Health in the Context of Canada’s 
Youth Justice System” (2015) 19:1 Canadian Criminal Law Review 5.
49. Gary Chaimowitz, “The Criminalization of People with Mental Illness” 
(2012) 57:2 Canadian Journal of  Psychiatry 1.
50. Ibid at 5.
51. Ibid.
52. Jessica Jones, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice 
System” (2007) 51:6 International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology 723.
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of court processes and their rights within those processes.53 Within the 
criminal justice system, defendants with mental health issues can in some 
circumstances be diverted to special mental health courts,54 “designed to 
deal with accused persons who are experiencing mental health difficulties 
with understanding and sensitivity”.55 Defendants must meet strict 
criteria before diversion to these special courts: primary among these 
is the condition that the individual must be diagnosed with a mental 
disorder.56 The mere fact of diversion to these courts, therefore, reveals 
meaningful and likely stigmatizing information about the individual 
whose case is diverted. Despite this, mental health court records57 and 
the results of appeals from those courts are not routinely anonymized 
across Canada.58 
Over-representation of marginalized populations is not limited to 
53. Susan C Hayes, “Prevalence of Intellectual Disability in Local Courts” 
(1997) 22:2 Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability 71. See 
also Voula Marions et al, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and the 
Criminal Justice System: A View from Criminal Justice Professionals in 
Ontario” (2017) 64:1 Criminal Law Quarterly 83.
54. Steven K Erickson, Amy Campbell & Steven J Lamberti, “Variations in 
Mental Health Courts: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Action” 
(2006) 42:4 Community Mental Health Journal 335.
55. “Mental Health Court” Legal Aid Ontario, online: Legal Aid Ontario 
<lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court>. 
56. See for example the eligibility for Mental Health Court in Nova Scotia: 
See, “Nova Scotia Mental Health Court Program” Courts of Nova Scotia, 
online: Courts of Nova Scotia <www.courts.ns.ca/Provincial_Court/
NSPC_mental_health_program.htm>.
57. For example, hearings in and records relating to Vancouver’s Downtown 
Community Court are public.
58. See, for example: R v E, 2012 NLCA 26.  We have chosen to anonymize 
citations that raise the very privacy and equality concerns discussed in this 
article.
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the criminal justice system. In Canada59 and elsewhere,60 Indigenous 
children, and thus their parents, are at increased risk for involvement in 
the child welfare system. Similarly, parents with intellectual disabilities 
constitute a higher proportion of child protection cases than would be 
expected given the prevalence of intellectual disabilities in the general 
population.61 One study of the BC child protection system documented 
a litany of intersecting challenges facing those (mostly women) involved 
in that system, including domestic violence, mental health issues, poverty, 
and addiction issues; that study also noted the over-representation 
of Indigenous mothers in the child protection cases they reviewed.62 
Although child welfare system proceedings are protected from public 
access, in many of these cases there are concurrent criminal and/or family 
proceedings that do not automatically receive such protection;63 thus, the 
greater involvement of individuals from equality-seeking groups in these 
matters is likely to be associated with involvement in other justice system 
proceedings that do present privacy risks.
Members of vulnerable groups including Indigenous peoples, 
immigrants, those receiving social assistance, members of ethnic 
minorities, and those living with disabilities are more likely to experience 
justiciable problems such as personal injury, family breakdown, or issues 
59. Nico Trocmé, Della Knoke & Cindy Blackstock, “Pathways to the 
Overrepresentation of Aboriginal Children in Canada’s Child Welfare 
System” (2004) 78:4 Social Service Review 577.
60. Clare Tilbury, “The Over-Representation of Indigenous Children in the 
Australian Child Welfare System” (2009) 18:1 International Journal of 
Social Welfare 57.
61. Stephon Proctor & Sandra Azar, “The Effect of Parental Intellectual 
Disability Status on Child Protection Service Worker Decision Making” 
(2013) 57:12 Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 1104.
62. Judith Mosoff et al, “Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child 
Protection Law in BC” (2017) 50:2 UBC Law Review 435.
63. Canada, Department of Justice, “Concurrent Legal Proceedings in Cases 
of Family Violence: The Child Protection Perspective” by Nicholas Bala & 
Kate Kehoe (Ottawa: DOJ, 2013), online: DOJ <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/fv-vf/child_protection.pdf>.
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with assistance programs.64 These problems, moreover, tend to occur 
in clusters: for example, legal problems related to separation are often 
accompanied by problems with domestic violence, and other issues 
related to family breakdown such as custody and access.65 Similarly, 
individuals living with disabilities are not only more likely to experience 
these types of problems; they also experience more such problems.66 To 
the extent that members of marginalized groups recognize their problems 
as legal problems or are involved with others who do, they may be more 
likely to be involved, and involved more intensely, with the civil justice 
system.
Many of these risk factors intersect in the lives of affected individuals, 
with a compounding impact on the likelihood that the individual will be 
involved with the court system. Mental health issues and drug use are 
elevated among the homeless population.67 People with mental health 
challenges often live in poverty, while mentally ill and homeless adults 
are more likely to be involved in the criminal justice system if they also 
experience substance misuse and previous victimization.68 Indigenous 
peoples are more likely than the general population to live in conditions 
of homelessness.69  
64. Canada, Department of Justice, “The Legal Problems of Everyday 
Life: The Nature, Extent and Consequences of Justiciable Problems 
Experienced by Canadians”, by Ab Currie (Ottawa: DOJ, 2007), online: 
DOJ <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr07_la1-rr07_aj1/rr07_
la1.pdf>; Alexy Buck, Nigel Balmer & Pascoe Pleasence, “Social Exclusion 
and Civil Law: Experience of Civil Justice Problems Among Vulnerable 
Groups” (2005) 39:3 Social Policy & Administration 302.
65. Pascoe Pleasence et al, “Multiple Justiciable Problems: Common Clusters 
and Their Social and Demographic Indicators” (2004) 1:2 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 301.
66. A O’Grady et al, “Disability, Social Exclusion, and the Consequential 
Experience of Justiciable Problems” (2004) 19:3 Disability & Society 259.
67. Katherine H Shelton et al, “Risk Factors for Homelessness: Evidence from 
a Population-Based Study” (2009) 60:4 Psychiatric Services 465.
68. Laurence Roy et al, “Profiles of Criminal Justice System Involvement of 
Mentally Ill Homeless Adults” (2016) 45:1 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 75 at 79. 
69. Novac et al, supra note 38.
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An exhaustive review of the relationship between vulnerability and 
justice system involvement is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
pattern is clear: people who are socially marginalized are more likely to 
be involved with the justice system (or at least with certain aspects of 
it). Those individuals involved in the system are also vulnerable to the 
privacy harms that result from being identified in court records. Those 
harms, therefore, are differentially affecting specific groups – the socially 
marginalized who are, by virtue of a wide range of factors, more likely to 
be in the courts. 
2.  Addressing Marginalization in the Courts
Marginalized individuals suffer harms related to their marginalized status 
– and one way to address these harms is to seek relief in the courts or 
through administrative tribunals. These situations constitute a kind of 
double jeopardy or recursive effect: vulnerability leads to involvement 
with the justice system, which leads to loss of privacy, including privacy 
with respect to vulnerable status, which in turn can lead to increased 
discrimination. 
Homeless individuals, for example, have been involved in court 
proceedings that test their right to erect shelters in public parks70 or on 
city property,71 with the result that their names are made public along 
with details of their homeless status. ‘Safe Streets’ legislation, passed in 
Ontario72 and in British Columbia,73 prohibits “aggressive solicitation of 
persons in public places”, allowing police to issue tickets for panhandling. 
Given that the individuals so charged are typically living in conditions of 
poverty, it is not surprising that the tickets often go unpaid. At least one 
individual has been taken to court over unpaid fines.74 This individual 
opted to participate in press interviews about the case, and thus forewent 
his privacy with respect to the court proceeding and personal information 
70. Abbotsford (City) v S, 2015 BCSC 1909.
71. J v Victoria (City), 2011 BCCA 400.
72. Safe Streets Act, SO 1999, c 8.
73. Safe Streets Act, SBC 2004, c 75, online: BC Laws <www.bclaws.ca/civix/
document/id/complete/statreg/04075_01>.
74. R v W, 2016 ONCJ 96. 
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about himself and his situation.75 Nonetheless, his option to maintain 
privacy with respect to private matters including his homeless status 
would have been wiped out by the public nature of the court proceeding. 
In other cases, individuals have been charged under Ontario’s Safe Streets 
Act for soliciting an individual waiting at a bus stop76 or offering to clean 
car windows for passing motorists.77 Although the disclosures in most of 
these records are limited to the names of the individuals involved and the 
activities they are charged with undertaking (which by extension label the 
individuals as street-involved), one of the records goes into much greater 
detail, revealing highly personal information about the social history 
and mental health of the individual charged with the offence.  In these 
cases, there is a direct link between marginalized status (homelessness, for 
example) and the appearance before the courts.
The relationship between vulnerability and involvement is even 
more direct in the case of human rights tribunals, where it is precisely 
an experience of alleged discrimination on the basis of protected grounds 
that brings the individual to the tribunal. Some other tribunals and 
boards, including the Veterans Appeal Review Board, routinely remove 
identifying information on the grounds that it is “personal information 
not relevant to the decision”.78 Likewise, the Social Benefits Tribunal 
of Ontario holds hearings in private because of the sensitive personal 
75. “Ontario Judge Drops $65,000 in Fines Against Former Homeless Man” 
Toronto Metro (4 October 2016), online: Metro News <www.metronews.
ca/news/toronto/2016/10/04/judge-drops-65k-in-fines-against-former-
homeless-man.html>.
76. R v F, 2013 ONCJ 718.
77. R v B (2005), 248 DLR (4th) 118 (ONSC).
78. Canada, Veterans Review and Appeal Board, “Decisions” (Ottawa: VRAB, 
30 March 2016), online: VRAB <www.vrab-tacra.gc.ca/Decisions/
Decisions-eng.cfm>.
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information involved in the cases.79 Many individuals involved in 
immigration and refugee proceedings are there precisely because they are 
members of equality-seeking groups. The status of sensitive information 
revealed in these hearings is complex: proceedings before the Refugee 
Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division are private unless 
decisions are before the Federal Court for judicial review, and proceedings 
before the Immigration Appeal Division and the Immigration Division 
are public. Human rights tribunals in Canada, however, default to the 
identification of parties involved in human rights cases. The Human 
Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”), for example, tells potential 
applicants that “the hearings and decisions of the HRTO are public 
except in very special circumstances … and the tribunal’s decisions, 
which include the applicants’ names and relevant evidence, are made 
publicly available through legal reporting services”.80 We will return to 
the HRTO’s practices with respect to anonymization in Part III below.
3.  Records Reveal Stigmatizing Information
Open records of human rights tribunal proceedings reveal not only the 
name of the applicant, but also details of the alleged discrimination 
including the basis for that alleged discrimination (unless the applicant 
is successful in taking the often-costly step of seeking a publication ban 
or some other form of confidentiality order).  Thus, for example, in the 
records of these cases we can come to learn that an applicant suffers 
from depression, is pregnant, lives with a learning disability, identifies as 
transgender, or is homeless. These details are not incidentally revealed as 
part of the tribunal proceeding – they are necessarily revealed since they 
79. Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, “Social Benefits Tribunal: Legislation and 
Regulation” (Ontario: SJTO, 2015), online: SJTO <www.sjto.gov.on.ca/
sbt/legislation-and-regulation/>.  Similarly, the Child and Family Services 
Review Board bans publication of evidence and decisions, and allows only 
anonymized versions of its decisions to be posted on CanLII, and the 
Landlord Tenant Board retracts the names of tenants from its decisions 
before allowing them to be posted on CanLII.
80. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Frequently Asked Questions” (2015) 
online: SJTO <www.sjto.gov.on.ca/hrto/faqs>.
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often constitute the basis of the claim that is substance of the proceeding. 
Moreover, the personal information that is exposed in these records leaves 
the individual vulnerable to further discrimination. Thus, public access to 
these records can contribute to a “vicious cycle” of vulnerability.
The concern is not unfounded. One complainant who was found 
by the BC Human Rights Tribunal (“BCHRT”) to have experienced 
discrimination based on a mental health issue81 was in front of that same 
tribunal seven years later, again alleging discrimination based on mental 
illness.82 In that second complaint, which the Tribunal determined was 
justified, it was alleged that the respondents enacted their discrimination 
on the basis of information gleaned from the earlier human rights case – 
in other words, their knowledge of the mental illness could at least in part 
be attributed to an earlier, and public, human rights complaint.83   
Presumptive openness of court and tribunal records constitutes, for 
litigants, witnesses, and others named in the court process, forced disclosure 
of personal information. Given the option, people make careful and 
thoughtful decisions about to whom, when, and where to disclose personal 
information.84 This may be particularly true for stigmatizing conditions, 
where the potential consequences of disclosure include discrimination, 
social isolation, and even physical danger. Many individuals living with 
a disability, for example, choose not to disclose, in large part for fear 
of discrimination, especially with respect to employment.85 Individuals 
in the work force dealing with mental health issues who choose not to 
disclose cite fear of discrimination as the primary reason.86 Many living 
with positive HIV status carefully balance the psychological advantages 
81. G v The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 4), (2009) BCHRT 360.
82. G v Purewal and another, (2017) BCHRT 19.
83. Ibid.
84. Petronio & Altman, supra note 6.
85. Lita Jans, Steve Kaye & Erica C Jones, “Getting Hired: Successfully 
Employed People with Disabilities Offer Advice on Disclosure, 
Interviewing, and Job Search” (2012) 22:2 Journal of Occupational 
Rehabilitation 155.
86. Debbie Peterson, Nandika Currey & Sunny Collings, “‘You Don’t Look 
Like One of Them’: Disclosure of Mental Illness in the Workplace as an 
Ongoing Dilemma” (2011) 35:2 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal 145.
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of disclosure against the costs in terms of stigma and social inclusion.87 
While disclosure of transgender identity can have positive impacts on 
psychological well-being and personal relationships, it also raises the risk 
of loss of relationships and even physical violence.88  Notwithstanding the 
potential destigmatizing effects,89 disclosure of a marginalized status can 
harm the individual involved.90 It has been compellingly argued that we 
should not force such disclosures,91 since the practice could contravene 
constitutional protections,92 and might even be considered immoral.93 
Over-representation of marginalized communities in court and 
tribunal proceedings, often because of the impact of marginalization, 
combined with the potentially stigmatizing information that is revealed 
about individuals in court records leaves members of these communities 
disproportionately vulnerable to further discrimination and other harms. 
The potential for these harms stand to be exacerbated by widespread 
publicly-accessible online access to court records. We turn now to examine 
some of the limited instances in which Canadian law has recognized and 
responded to this “vicious cycle”.
87. Geneviève Rouleau, José Côté & Chantal Cara, “Disclosure Experience 
in a Convenience Sample of Quebec-born Women Living with HIV: A 
Phenomenological Study” (2012) 12:1 BMC Women’s Health 37.
88. M Paz Galupo et al, “Disclosure of Transgender Identity and Status in the 
Context of Friendship” (2014) 8:1 Journal of LGBT Issues in Counseling 
25.
89. See e.g. Arjan ER Bos et al, “Mental Illness Stigma and Disclosure: 
Consequences of Coming Out of the Closet” (2009) 30:8 Issues in 
Mental Health Nursing 509; Grace J Yoo et al, “Destigmatizing Hepatitis 
B in the Asian American Community: Lessons Learned from the 
San Francisco Hep B Free Campaign” (2012) 27:1 Journal of Cancer 
Education 138.
90. Roberts, supra note 29. 
91. Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic 
Violence and the Politics of Illusion” (2007) 22:3 Hypatia 43.
92. Anne C Hydorin, “Does the Constitutional Right to Privacy Protect 
Forced Disclosure of Sexual Orientation” (2003) 30:2 Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 237.
93. Susan J Becker, “The Immorality of Publicly Outing Private People” 
(1994) 73:1 Oregon Law Review 159.
23(2018) 4 CJCCL
III. Recognition of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle in 
Canadian Law
Notwithstanding that in most cases the privacy of those involved with 
court proceedings is not protected, our purpose in this section is to 
identify situations where Canadian law has explicitly or implicitly 
recognized the privacy/vulnerability cycle as a justification for limiting 
publication related to, or disclosure within court proceedings involving 
members of marginalized communities. In tandem with situations in 
which Canadian courts and legislatures have recognized the privacy/
vulnerability cycle in the context of disclosure of information to the public 
about court proceedings, are privacy-justified rules that limit both what 
must be produced in litigation and what can be done with it afterward. 
We begin by briefly discussing publication bans, which limit public 
access to information about court proceedings, and then turn to case-
by-case privilege and deemed/implied undertakings, which impose terms 
relating to disclosure within litigation. In both cases, the law recognizes 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle and expresses concern about the impact 
of process-imposed vulnerability on the administration of justice. We 
note the transition in this law from recognition of a general privacy/
vulnerability cycle to limited recognition of special risks to specific 
equality-seeking communities: children and sexual assault survivors in 
particular. After discussing publication bans, case-by-case privilege and 
deemed undertakings, we explore other legal manifestations of concern 
for children and sexual assault survivors before turning to consider 
more sporadic legal acknowledgments of the privacy/vulnerability cycle 
relating to other equality-seeking groups. Finally, we consider policy 
development and commentary focused on the privacy/vulnerability 
cycle in the context of online court records, which supports our concern 
about the potential for online records to exacerbate the cycle for equality-
seeking communities.   
A. Publication Bans and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle
The open court principle is highly venerated in Canadian law. It provides 
that, as a general rule, court processes and court records should be 
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publicly accessible. Openness is said to build “public confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system by allowing members of the public to hold 
judges to account”.94 The common law principle in favour of openness 
is also mirrored in provincial, federal and territorial statutes and policies 
governing court proceedings.95 Nevertheless, Canadian courts and 
legislators have recognized that, in certain circumstances, open access 
can undermine justice or come at too great a cost to other democratic 
values in a variety of ways. As a result, certain statutes and common law 
principles provide for courts and certain other decision-making bodies to 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether there should be an exception 
to that rule. These case-by-case decisions are to be made with reference to 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in two seminal cases relating to 
publication bans, R v Mentuck96 and Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp.97  
In Mentuck, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a publication 
ban should only be issued where:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper 
administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not 
prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects 
on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects 
on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, 
and the efficacy of the administration of justice.98
In Dagenais, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed to a long list of 
competing considerations of sufficient weight to warrant a publication 
ban. At least three of these implicitly recognize the way in which a lack 
94. Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2 at 152.
95. See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43, ss 135, 137; Provincial 
Court of British Columbia, “Access to Court Records” Policy Code ACC-
2 (British Columbia: 28 February 2011) online: Provincial Court BC 
<www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/downloads/public%20and%20media%20
access%20policies/ACC-2%20-%20Access%20to%20Court%20Records.
pdf>
96. 2001 SCC 76 [Mentuck].
97. [1994] 3 SCR 835 [Dagenais].
98. Mentuck, supra note 96 at para 32. 
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of privacy can exacerbate inequality and vulnerability, namely: protecting 
vulnerable witnesses (e.g. children, sexual assault complainants); reducing 
the stigma of conviction for young offenders, thereby increasing the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and encouraging reporting of sexual offences 
by reducing the fear of notoriety of becoming a complainant.99
The issues of protecting children and targets of sexual violence came 
together in AB v Bragg.100  The Supreme Court of Canada held that a 
teen girl who sought a publication ban on the content of a Facebook 
page in which she was subjected to “sexualized cyberbullying”, should 
be allowed to proceed using a pseudonym on a preliminary application 
for disclosure.101 Relying on the decisions in Dagenais and Mentuck, and 
noting research showing that “allowing the names of child victims and 
other identifying information to appear in the media can exacerbate 
trauma, complicate recovery, discourage future disclosures, and inhibit 
cooperation with authorities”,102 as well as the lasting harms of the 
publicity of sexualized online attacks, Abella J, writing for the Court, 
concluded:
If we value the right of children to protect themselves from bullying, cyber or 
otherwise, if common sense and the evidence persuade us that young victims of 
sexualized bullying are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization 
upon publication, and if we accept that the right to protection will disappear 
for most children without the further protection of anonymity, we are 
compellingly drawn in this case to allowing A.B.’s anonymous legal pursuit of 
the identity of her cyberbully.103 
Here the Court explicitly recognized the “vicious cycle” of a lack of privacy 
and the “inherent vulnerability of children”.104 In addition, Abella J noted 
that “[i]n the context of sexual assault, this Court has already recognized 
that protecting a victim’s privacy encourages reporting”.105 In this way, 
the cycle of gender inequality and lack of privacy in court proceedings 
99. Dagenais, supra note 97 at paras 883-84. 
100. 2012 SCC 46 [Bragg].
101. Ibid at paras 22, 26.  
102. Ibid at para 26.
103. Ibid at para 27.
104. Ibid at para 17 [emphasis in original].
105. Ibid at para 25.
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is evident, although the Court did not explicitly discuss the plaintiff’s 
situation in these terms. The plaintiff had already suffered a sexualized 
online attack (which included someone impersonating her and posting 
a photo of her), a kind of attack disproportionately suffered by women 
and girls, who are also more likely to be shamed in relation to exhibitions 
of their sexuality.106 A refusal to grant AB a degree of privacy in relation 
to her legal proceeding would have re-subjected her to further gendered 
scrutiny and attack – a classic illustration of the “vicious cycle” between 
the vulnerability of marginalized populations and a lack of privacy in 
court proceedings. Although AB was ultimately able to proceed under a 
pseudonym, her right to do so came at the cost of appeals all the way to 
the Supreme Court of Canada – a price most people, particularly those 
from many marginalized communities, are unlikely to be able to pay.  
B. Case-by-case Privilege and Deemed/Implied 
Undertakings
In contrast with publication bans, which focus solely on public access to 
information about court proceedings, case-by-case privilege and deemed/
implied undertakings impose limits relating to procedures internal to 
litigation. In both cases the focus is on balancing privacy with other kinds 
of public interests. In some cases, Canadian courts explicitly or implicitly 
connect privacy with vulnerability, and the risk that exposing litigants to 
too much vulnerability will jeopardize their right and ability to seek legal 
remedies. Thus, despite the truth-finding goal of litigation and the idea 
that disclosure of all relevant information best serves that goal, parties 
need not produce all relevant documents within litigation. As the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, per Southin JA, noted in Interclaim Holdings 
Limited v Down:
Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, … the notion that everybody is entitled 
to have access to everything filed in civil proceedings … in contradistinction to 
having the right to be present at every proceeding in which a final judgment is 
sought should be canvassed again.  A legal system which has no decent respect 
106. Jane Bailey, “‘Sexualized Online Bullying’ Through an Equality Lens: 
Missed Opportunity in AB v. Bragg?” (2014) 59:3 McGill Law Journal 
709. 
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for the privacy of litigants is as tyrannical as a legal system in which rights are 
determined behind closed doors.107
Documents subject to privilege represent an important exception to the 
general disclosure rule.108 While the traditional categories of privilege 
protect the solicitor-client relationship (solicitor-client privilege) and 
the process of litigation (litigation privilege), in Slavutych v Baker et al, 
the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that those categories are not 
closed109 and adopted a four-part test for determining on a case-by-case 
basis whether materials claimed to be confidential should be exempt from 
disclosure. This privilege applies to communications that: (i) originate in 
confidence; (ii) where confidence is essential to the relationship in which 
the communication arose; (iii) that relationship is one that should be 
“sedulously fostered; and (iv) the interests served by protecting against 
disclosure outweigh the interest in getting at the truth to correctly resolve 
the litigation.110  
In applying this four-part test in the context of a civil sexual assault 
case in M(A) v Ryan, where the defendant sought production of records 
from the plaintiff’s psychiatrist, the Supreme Court of Canada found 
that if psychiatrist-patient confidence was broken, it could jeopardize a 
patient’s willingness to seek treatment.111 Justice McLachlin (as she was 
then) writing for the majority, noted that such an outcome was to be 
avoided, especially in the context of survivors of “sexual abuse [who] often 
suffer trauma, which, left untreated, may mar their entire lives”.112 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on constitutional protections 
for privacy and equality, noting:
A rule of privilege which fails to protect confidential doctor/patient 
communications in the context of an action arising out of sexual assault 
perpetuates the disadvantage felt by victims of sexual assault, often women. The 
107. 2003 BCCA 266 at 32.
108. Although the existence of relevant documents over which privilege is 
claimed must be disclosed.  See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 
1990, Reg 194, s 30.02(1) [Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure].
109. Slavutych v Baker et al, [1976] 1 SCR 254.
110. M(A) v Ryan, [1997] 1 SCR 157 at para 20 [M(A)], referring to Slavutych.
111. Ibid at paras 25-26.
112. Ibid at para 27.
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intimate nature of sexual assault heightens the privacy concerns of the victim 
and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the rule, the difficulty of obtaining 
redress for the wrong. The victim of a sexual assault is thus placed in a 
disadvantaged position as compared with the victim of a different wrong. The 
result may be that the victim of sexual assault does not obtain the equal benefit 
of the law to which s. 15 of the Charter entitles her. She is doubly victimized, 
initially by the sexual assault and later by the price she must pay to claim 
redress.113
McLachlin J  also rejected the argument that a plaintiff forfeits the right 
to privacy by commencing litigation, finding:
I accept that a litigant must accept such intrusions upon her privacy as are 
necessary to enable the judge or jury to get to the truth and render a just 
verdict. But I do not accept that by claiming such damages as the law allows, 
a litigant grants her opponent a licence to delve into private aspects of her life 
which need not be probed for the proper disposition of the litigation.114
This reasoning subsequently carried over into analysis of the privacy rights 
of sexual assault complainants in the context of the deemed undertaking. 
The deemed and implied undertaking rules115 generally prohibit 
disclosure of “pre-trial documentary and oral discovery for purposes 
other than the litigation in which it was obtained”.116 Although these 
rules do not place similar restrictions on documentary and oral discovery 
that make their way into the public record during trials or motions, they 
nevertheless reflect recognition of the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its 
potential impact on the administration of justice. In Juman v Doucette, 
the Supreme Court of Canada, per Binnie J, pointed to privacy protection 
as one of two related rationales for these undertakings:
The public interest in getting at the truth in a civil action outweighs 
the examinee’s privacy interest, but the latter is nevertheless entitled to 
a measure of protection. The answers and documents are compelled by 
statute solely for the purpose of the civil action and the law thus requires 
that the invasion of privacy should generally be limited to the level of 
113. Ibid at para 30.
114. Ibid at para 38.
115. The implied undertaking exists as a product of common law, while 
deemed undertakings are typically reflected in provincial Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 108, s 
30.1.
116. Juman v Doucette, 2008 SCC 8 at 21.
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disclosure necessary to satisfy that purpose and that purpose alone. ... 
There is a second rationale supporting the existence of an implied 
undertaking. A litigant who has some assurance that the documents and 
answers will not be used for a purpose collateral or ulterior to the proceedings 
in which they are demanded will be encouraged to provide a more complete 
and candid discovery.117  
That the imposition of such limits can be of particular importance in the 
context of civil and criminal proceedings relating to sexual assault was 
recognized at first instance in SC v NS where the defendant in a criminal 
sexual assault trial used documents produced by the complainant in a civil 
sexual assault proceeding in order to impeach her during her testimony 
at the criminal trial.118 The Court’s finding that the deemed undertaking 
prevented the defendant from using the documents in another 
proceeding without first seeking leave of the court was overturned on 
appeal.  However, the observations of Matheson J with respect to privacy 
remain apt.  Justice Matheson rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
plaintiff had given up her right to privacy by initiating the civil action, 
reasoning:
If that choice defeated all privacy interests, the deemed undertaking would not 
exist.  Instead, the court and the Rules of Civil Procedure have acknowledged 
that plaintiffs remain entitled to some measure of protection of their privacy 
and are entitled to limitations on the use of their discovery evidence outside the 
proceedings for which the discovery was compelled.119
Finding that “[t]he primary concern underlying the undertaking is the 
protection of privacy – discovery is an invasion of the right of an individual 
to keep one’s evidence and documents to oneself ”,120 Matheson J went 
on to note the privacy/vulnerability cycle recognized in Criminal Code121 
restrictions on use of complainant’s medical or counselling records in a 
sexual assault trial. In particular, she noted that parliamentary adoption 
of those restrictions and a detailed process for determining whether such 
records could be used:
117. Ibid at paras 25-26.
118. 2017 ONSC 353; overturned 2017 ONSC 556 [SC].
119. Ibid at para 80.
120. Ibid at para 39.
121. RSC 1995, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
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Parliament has recognized that the compelled production of personal 
information may deter complainants of sexual offences from reporting the 
events to police and from seeking the necessary treatment, counselling or 
advice; that production may breach a person’s right to privacy and equality; 
and that the production to the accused of such information may be necessary 
in order for an accused to make full answer and defence.122
We turn now to discuss specific exceptions to openness in relation to 
children and sexual assault complainants found elsewhere in Canadian 
law in order to highlight the role that recognition of the privacy/
vulnerability cycle plays in relation to each, paying particular attention 
to explanations for exceptions that connect privacy, vulnerability and 
membership in equality-seeking communities.
C. Children and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle
The connection between the privacy/vulnerability cycle and 
marginalization is most consistently demonstrated in Canadian law with 
respect to the protection of children in court proceedings. Here we provide 
examples from two areas: child welfare and family law proceedings, and 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”).123
1. Child Welfare and Family Law Proceedings
In addition to the examples discussed in part A above, Canadian courts 
also connect privacy with the vulnerability of children in the context of 
provincial child welfare legislation124 and in family law proceedings.125 
Although child welfare legislation can incorporate both provisions that 
initially presume in favour of openness and those that initially presume 
against openness, here we focus on the former. In Chatham-Kent Children’s 
Services v AH, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed a media 
request to vary an order excluding the public from a hearing by allowing 
access to a redacted copy of the transcript of an in camera hearing in 
122. SC, supra note 118 at para 95. 
123. SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA].
124. See e.g. Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C11, s 45(8); Child 
and Family Services Act, SS 1989-90, c C-7.2, s 26 [CFSA]. 
125. See e.g. Provincial Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 379, s 3(6) [Provincial Court 
Act].
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a child protection proceeding involving the disappearance of several 
children who had been apprehended from the jurisdiction.126 Although 
citing Bragg, and other criminal and family law cases, Templeton J noted 
that the case before him was not a criminal, civil matter or family law 
matter, but a child protection proceeding. He concluded that restrictions 
on public access to the transcript were necessary because: 
in certain circumstances, the protection of a vulnerable child and that child’s 
privacy may well go beyond merely the name of the child in protection 
proceedings. Children who are the subject of an application by the state for 
intervention are also allegedly vulnerable in their environment at home, at 
school and/or in their neighbourhood. They are subject to the conduct 
and attitudes of the adults who interact with them. Disclosure to others of 
the intimacy of their lives is beyond their control. Without the ability or 
opportunity for critical thought, they are swept into a process of the balancing 
of rights of others and in that process, it can be difficult to hear their voice. ... 
In other words, the child’s world and privacy are inextricably linked to an 
investigation of the parent’s.127
As a result, Templeton J concluded that in child protection matters, “the 
need to shield a vulnerable child rests not only on the child’s chronological 
age but also and perhaps more significantly, the factual circumstances in 
which the child lives or has been placed”.128
In contrast, while citing similar authorities to those relied upon in 
AH, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, per Rothery J, concluded 
in the context of child protection proceedings in R(MN) v Saskatchewan 
(Minister of Social Services) that the CBC could publish the name of a 
parent accused of harming her children, provided that they gave advanced 
notice of the broadcast to the Department of Social Services in the area 
where her children resided.129  Rothery J found that although section 
26(2) of the Child and Family Services Act130 permitted publication bans 
where publication would not be in the best interests of a child involved in 
the hearing or would likely identify a child, “[t]he court is not permitted 
to weigh the effect of the publication on the parents of the child. Thus, 
126. 2014 ONSC 1697 [AH].
127. Ibid at paras 42-43.
128. Ibid at para 44.
129. (1999), 179 Sask R 238, (QB) at para 28 [R(MN)].
130. CFSA, supra note 124.
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unless the publication of the parent’s name affects the child, there is no 
justification for the limitation of the freedom of expression”.131  
Meanwhile, in British Columbia, rules of court impose stringent 
restrictions on public access to court records relating to child welfare 
proceedings, family law cases and separation agreements,132 and various 
statutes restrict publication of information in family and children’s 
matters that would likely disclose the identity of a child or party.133 As 
a result, although BC offers the most extensive online access to court 
records in Canada through Court Services Online (“CSO”),134 public 
access is available only in relation to civil and criminal cases (with certain 
exceptions discussed further below), and not in relation to family law 
cases. 
2. Youth Criminal Justice Act
The YCJA came into effect in 2003, replacing the Young Offenders Act, 
which had been in place since 1984.135 The YCJA creates a specialized 
framework for dealing with children under the age of 12 and young people 
between the ages of 12 and 18 who are involved in criminal offences.136 It 
recognizes society’s responsibility to “address the developmental challenges 
and the needs of young persons and to guide them into adulthood”, as 
well as the “special guarantees” of children’s and young people’s rights and 
freedoms, and the goal of “effective rehabilitation and reintegration” of 
131. R(MN), supra note 129 at para 26.
132. British Columbia, “Court Record Access Policy” (Vancouver: Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, 2011) at 21, online: <www.courts.gov.bc.ca/
supreme_court/announcements/BCSC%20Court%20Record%20
Access%20Policy%20-%20February%2014%202011.pdf>.
133. See e.g. Provincial Court Act, supra note 125, s 3(6). 
134. British Columbia, “Welcome to Court Services Online” Court Services 
Online, Version 3.0.0.04, online: Courts of British Columbia <https://
justice.gov.bc.ca/cso/index.do>. 
135. Canada, Department of Justice, “Canadian Youth Justice Legislation: A 
Chronology” (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2015), online: DOJ <www.
justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/sheets-feuillets/yjc-jaac.html>.
136. YCJA, supra note 123, s 2(1). 
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young people into society after involvement in criminal proceedings.137  
Restrictions relating to publication, records and information 
about young people are imposed in Part 6 of the YCJA as one means 
of addressing these objectives. For example, section 110(1) prohibits 
(subject to specific exceptions) publication of the name of any young 
person dealt with under the YCJA, or any other information about them 
that would identify them, while later sections in Part 6 impose limitations 
on creation, access to, and destruction of records related to YCJA 
investigations and proceedings involving young people.138 Generally, 
breach of the publication ban is a criminal offence.139 According to the 
Department of Justice:
The rationale for protecting the privacy of young persons through publication 
bans is in recognition of their immaturity and the need to protect them from 
the harmful effects of publication so that their chances of rehabilitation are 
maximized.140
The cycle connecting privacy, vulnerability and youth is explored in some 
detail in a number of Canadian cases and has been reiterated frequently 
in parliamentary debate.141
In FN (Re) the Supreme Court of Canada found that section 110(1) 
protected already vulnerable youth made more vulnerable by publication, 
while at the same time achieving broader societal goals.  Writing for the 
Court, Binnie J, noted:
Stigmatization or premature “labeling” of a young offender still in his or her 
formative years is well understood as a problem in the juvenile justice system. 
A young person once stigmatized as a lawbreaker may, unless given help and 
redirection, render the stigma a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the long run, society 
137. Ibid, preamble.
138. Ibid, ss 110-29.
139. Ibid, s 110.
140. Canada, Department of Justice, “Publication Bans” (Ottawa: Department 
of Justice, 2015), online: DOJ <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-
outils/sheets-feuillets/publi-publi.html>.
141. See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 067 
(29 May 2001) at 4343 (Odina Desrochers); House of Commons Debates, 
37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 036 (26 March 2001) at 2217 (Reg 
Alcock); House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 137, No 036 
(26 March 2001) at 2217 (Ken Epp). 
34 
 
Burkell & Bailey, Equity at Stake
is best protected by preventing recurrence. Lamer CJ, in Dagenais … pointed 
out in another context that non-publication is designed to “maximize the 
chances of rehabilitation for “young offenders””.142 
Abella J, writing for the majority in R v DB the Supreme Court of Canada, 
cited social science research and international instruments recognizing the 
negative impact of media on young people, in support of the conclusion 
that the YCJA restrictions on publication afforded necessary protection 
to youth because of the  “greater psychological and social stress” they 
would be vulnerable to upon publication.143 The majority cited expert 
testimony before the Standing Committee on Justice that indicated that 
“you’d be hardpressed to find a single professional who has worked in this 
area who would be in favour of the publication of names”, and appellate 
authority from Quebec and Ontario emphasizing the “damage” that 
“stigmatizing and labelling” a young person could do to their self-image 
and self-worth.144 In light of this, the majority, per Abella J, found that 
lifting a ban on publication should be seen as an element of sentencing 
that “renders the sentence more severe”.145 However, the majority also 
tied the right to privacy protection to a presumed “diminished moral 
culpability” of young persons, noting that children’s “lack of experience 
with the world warrants leniency and optimism for the future”, and 
concluding that “offenders who act out of immaturity, impulsiveness, 
or other illconsidered motivation are not to be dealt with as if they were 
proceeding with the same degree of insight into their wrongdoing as 
more mature, reflective, or considered individuals”.146 Obviously, this 
particular aspect of the explanation of the privacy/vulnerability cycle 
cannot and should not be extended to adults from other equality-seeking 
groups. 
Relying in part on DB, the Ontario Court of Justice, per Cohen J, 
142. 2000 SCC 35 at para 14.
143. 2008 SCC 25 at para 87 [DB].
144. Ibid at paras 84-85.
145. Ibid at para 87.
146. Ibid at para 62-63, quoting, respectively, Allan Manson, The Law of 
Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 103-04 and Gilles Renaud, 
Speaking to Sentence: A Practical Guide (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at 10.
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in Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd v Ontario pointed to the YCJA restrictions 
on publication as one indication that the proper administration of justice 
requires consideration of young people’s privacy rights.147 Cohen J denied 
a media request for access to victim impact statements and pre-sentence 
reports in three cases involving young offenders convicted of serious 
crimes. She found that the YCJA publication restrictions were connected 
to the presumed diminished moral culpability of young people, but were 
also rooted in protecting their “dignity, personal integrity and autonomy” 
as required by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.148 The reasoning in Toronto Star, which 
the Supreme Court of Canada cited with approval in Bragg,149 has also 
been relied upon by other Ontario courts as a touchstone for protecting 
young people when determining whether court-connected materials 
relating to them ought to be disclosed.150
D. Sexual Assault Complainants and the Privacy/
Vulnerability Cycle
A number of Criminal Code provisions that connect the privacy/
vulnerability cycle with inequality relate to sexual assault complainants. 
Here we focus on two such provisions: prohibition of the publication 
of identifying information about sexual assault complainants and 
restrictions on the use of complainants’ past sexual history at trial.
1. Prohibitions on Publication of Identifying Information 
The Criminal Code includes numerous provisions that initially presume 
in favour of openness, but grant judges discretion to impose restrictions 
relating to hearings and publication of identifying information. For 
147. 2012 ONCJ 27 at paras 33-48 [Toronto Star].
148. Ibid at paras 43-47. See: Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 
November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990); 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
149. Bragg, supra note 100 at para 18.
150. See e.g. R v Beckford and Stone, 2012 ONSC 7365; Chief of Police v 
Mignardi, 2016 ONSC 5500.
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example, under section 486.31 a judge may, on application by the 
prosecutor or a witness, order non-disclosure of a witness’ identity.151 
Under section 486.4 a judge may order non-disclosure of information 
that could identify a witness or victim in the context of proceedings 
involving sexual offences.152 However, under section 486.4(2), a judge 
must order non-disclosure of identifying information relating to a witness 
under 18 or a victim in proceedings involving sexual offences if the 
witness, victim or prosecutor applies for such an order.153 In considering 
the constitutionality of this provision in Canadian Newspapers Co v 
Canada (Attorney General),154 the Supreme Court of Canada connected 
the cycle of privacy and vulnerability to the broader societal objective of 
encouraging reporting of widely under-reported sexual offences.  Lamer 
J (as he then was), writing for the Court, noted:
In the present case, the impugned provision purports to foster complaints by 
victims of sexual assault by protecting them from the trauma of wide-spread 
publication resulting in embarrassment and humiliation.  Encouraging victims 
to come forward and complain facilitates the prosecution and conviction 
of those guilty of sexual offences.  Ultimately, the overall objective of the 
publication ban ... is to favour the suppression of crime and to improve the 
administration of justice.155
In this way, the Court recognized the connection between privacy and 
vulnerability, finding that it weighed in favour of imposing limitations 
on publication. However, it tied the concern about protecting against 
vulnerability to goals relating to the administration of justice, rather 
than to protecting the privacy rights of an equality-seeking group per se. 
This, combined with the fact that the Criminal Code provision permits 
the decision about publication to be taken out of a sexually assaulted 
woman’s hands by allowing the prosecutor to make the application, raises 
questions about how effectively it addresses the privacy/vulnerability 
cycle for women, who are disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual 
151. Criminal Code, supra note 121, s 486.31.
152. Ibid, s 486.4.
153. Ibid, s 486.4(2).
154. [1988] 2 SCR 122.
155. Ibid at para 15.
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violence.156  
2. Restrictions on the Use of Complainants’ Past Sexual 
History
The Criminal Code also addresses the privacy rights of sexual assault 
complainants by imposing limits on use of the complainant’s past sexual 
history. Section 276 of the Criminal Code, requires an accused who seeks 
to bring forward the past sexual history of a complainant in a sexual assault 
case to first bring a motion for leave to do so.157 In deciding whether 
to allow such evidence, the court must consider, among other things, 
“the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory 
belief or bias” and “the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal 
dignity and right of privacy”.158 Publication, broadcast or transmission of 
information relating to the application is prohibited unless the evidence is 
determined admissible or the judge orders the determination and reasons 
to be published.159 While it is at best unclear whether this provision is 
actually applied in a way that positively affects equality,160 the reasoning 
underlying the provision does connect privacy, vulnerability and equality.
In R v Mills161 the Court, referring to its reasons in M(A) (discussed 
above in Part III.B)., upheld the constitutionality of Criminal Code 
amendments that protected against what Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had 
previously referred to as “extensive and unwarranted inquiries into 
the past histories and private lives of complainants of sexual assault”, 
a practice she said “indulges the discriminatory suspicion that women 
156. For further discussion, see Jane Doe, “What’s in a Name? Who Benefits 
from the Publication Ban in Sexual Assault Trials?” in Ian Kerr, Valerie 
Steeves & Carole Lucock, eds, Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, 
Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 265.
157. Criminal Code, supra note 121, s 276.
158. Ibid, s 276(3)(d), (f ).
159. Ibid, s 276.3.
160. For further discussion see Lise Gotell, “When Privacy is not enough: 
Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and the Disclosure 
of Personal Records” (2006) 43:3 Alberta Law Review 743.
161. [1999] 3 SCR 668 [Mills].
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and children’s reports of sexual victimization are uniquely likely to be 
fabricated”.162 Noting privacy’s “underlying values of dignity, integrity 
and autonomy”,163 McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ, writing for the majority 
in Mills, went on to connect the privacy/vulnerability cycle to equality in 
the context of compelled disclosure in court proceedings:
When the boundary between privacy and full answer and defence is not 
properly delineated, the equality of individuals whose lives are heavily 
documented is also affected, as these individuals have more records that will 
be subject to wrongful scrutiny. Karen Busby cautions that the use of records 
to challenge credibility at large will subject those whose lives already have been 
subject to extensive documentation to extraordinarily invasive review. This 
would include women whose lives have been documented under conditions 
of multiple inequalities and institutionalization such as Aboriginal women, 
women with disabilities, or women who have been imprisoned or involved 
with child welfare agencies.164
E. Other Equality-Seeking Groups and the Privacy/
Vulnerability Cycle
Although Canadian law involving young persons and sexual assault 
complainants more consistently (but certainly not always) acknowledges 
the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its connection to equality, there is 
at least a limited recognition of the cycle in relation to certain other 
equality-seeking groups. This pattern is repeated in the human rights 
tribunal cases to which we now turn.
As discussed in Part II.B.2. above, certain court and tribunal rules 
and procedures also recognize and attempt to mitigate the “vicious cycle” 
of privacy loss and vulnerability, although the rationale for defaulting 
in favour of access in some cases where clearly vulnerable community 
members are involved and not in others involving equally vulnerable 
participants remains unclear. Nonetheless, here we explore HRTO 
practices that suggest privacy/vulnerability rationales for limiting access 
162. R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411 at paras 122-23 [emphasis added].
163. Mills, supra note 161 at paras 80-81 [emphasis omitted].
164. Ibid at para 92, citing Karen Busby, “Discriminatory Uses of Personal 
Records in Sexual Violence Cases” (1997) 9:1 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 148 at 161-62.
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to records and/or proceedings.
As noted above, human rights proceedings, based as they are on claims 
related to social locations that render individuals and groups vulnerable 
to discrimination, would seem to provide classic examples of situations 
in which the privacy/vulnerability cycle is likely be at play. Many human 
rights tribunals in Canada are authorized to preclude public access to 
hearings and to limit access to their case files on a case-by-case basis.165 
Hearings before the HRTO, for example, “are open to the public” unless 
the Tribunal orders otherwise,166 and all written decisions are publicly 
available.167 The HRTO may order protection of the “confidentiality of 
personal or sensitive information where it considers it appropriate to do 
so”, but unless otherwise ordered, in its decisions it must use initials to 
identify children under 18 and the representative of children under 18 
in the proceeding.168 HRTO’s practice direction states anonymization 
of decisions will only happen in two circumstances: to protect children’s 
identity or in “exceptional circumstances”.169 As such, we again see a 
prioritization of children’s privacy.
MacDonnell’s analysis of HRTO decisions relating to requests 
for confidentiality suggest that success in such cases is more likely for 
165. See e.g. Alberta Human Rights Commission, Procedural Manual 
for Tribunal Hearings, at 10-11, online: ABHRC <https://www.
albertahumanrights.ab.ca/Documents/Procedural_Manual_
September_2015.pdf>; British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5, online: BCHRT <www.bchrt.bc.ca/
shareddocs/rules/RulesOfPracticeAndProcedure.pdf >.
166. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.10, online: 
<www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/hrto/Practice%20Directions/HRTO%20
Rules%20of%20Procedure.html#3>.
167. Ibid, Rule 3.12.
168. Ibid, Rule 3.11, 3.11.1. The HRTO may also use initials for other parties 
if it is necessary to protect a child’s identity, at Rule 3.11.1.
169. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Practice Direction on Anonymization 
of HRTO Decisions, online: SJTO <www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/hrto/
Practice%20Directions/Anonymization %20of%20HRTO%20Decisions.
html>.
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minors, applicants claiming sexual harassment,170 and where a ban has 
issued in a related criminal case. Anonymization has also been ordered 
in a handful of cases where the sexual orientation or gender identity of 
the applicant was in issue.171 In contrast, confidentiality requests in cases 
involving claims related to race, ethnic origin, creed, place of origin or 
ethnic origin, or which raised the issue of reprisal were unsuccessful, 
while requests in cases involving disability produced mixed results.172 In 
a case decided after MacDonnell’s analysis, a request on the basis of being 
a recipient of social assistance was rejected.173 
The HRTO imposes a high standard for obtaining confidentiality 
with respect to disability, notwithstanding social science evidence 
documenting the continuing stigma attached to mental illness and the 
negative employment, insurance, parenting and other life repercussions 
that can result from disclosure of mental illness.174 For example, in K 
v Northern Initiative for Social Action, the HRTO concluded that “[a] 
general claim that there is still stigma associated with mental illness 
is insufficient” to justify anonymization.175 In light of this approach, 
it seems logical to suggest that those who prefer not to have their 
disabilities publicly disclosed in HRTO decisions will be deterred from 
seeking relief,176 just as the Supreme Court of Canada in Bragg found 
child victims of “online sexualized cyberbullying” were likely to be 
deterred from seeking a legal remedy in the absence of some form of 
170. MacDonnell, supra note 2. However, anonymization in sexual harassment 
cases is not automatic: B v H, 2012 HRTO 212.  
171. MacDonnell, ibid at 115-8.
172. Ibid at 118-9.
173. C v Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2016 HRTO 691. This 
decision seems particularly paradoxical in light of the fact that the Social 
Benefits Tribunal of Ontario (and indeed all other Social Justice Tribunals 
in Ontario other than the HRTO) anonymize their decisions in some 
way: MacDonnell, supra note 2 at 136.
174. MacDonnell, ibid at 122-123.
175. 2014 HRTO 136 at para 9. See also F v Toronto Transit Commission, 2017 
HRTO 514 at paras 27-28; K v Toronto Police Service, 2012 HRTO 1374 
at para 20.
176. MacDonnell, supra note 2 at 125.
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confidentiality.177 Deterring claims by those who prefer not to disclose 
their disabilities arguably undermines their right to equal benefit and 
protection of the law in the same way that disclosure of the identities of 
sexual assault complainants without their consent triggers their equality 
rights, as found by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mills.178
Notwithstanding concerns around HRTO practice in relation to 
disability and certain other grounds of discrimination, in situations 
where the HRTO does decide to order anonymization of its decisions, its 
reasons sometimes acknowledge the privacy/vulnerability cycle.  In GG v 
1489024 Ontario Ltd, for example, the HRTO ordered anonymization 
in a case involving allegations of sexual harassment.179  Although 
Adjudicator Whist noted that the mere fact that “issues of a personal 
or sensitive nature” would not be enough to justify anonymization, he 
concluded that the case fell “within one of the exceptional situations” 
where anonymization was appropriate, citing a “risk of disclosure of 
highly sensitive information” in a case where the applicant had “already 
been subject to a sexual assault arising out of the facts that form the basis” 
for her complaint.180
F. The Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle and Online Court 
Records: Commentary and Policy 
Policymakers have also articulated concerns about the privacy/vulnerability 
cycle in considering the implications of online accessibility of court 
records. In British Columbia, for example, the Provincial Court issued a 
direction to prevent remote online access to non-conviction information, 
177. Bragg, supra note 100.
178. Criminal Code, supra note 121, ss 486.31, 486.4, 486.4(2).
179. 2012 HRTO 824.
180. Ibid at para 9.
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stays of proceedings and peace bonds after specific periods of time.181 
The direction specifically refers to submissions filed as part of a public 
consultation on the issue that illustrate the privacy/vulnerability cycle 
and unjust stigma arising from the use of non-conviction information 
to judge individuals’ suitability for jobs and rental accommodation.182 
Justice Bielby of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench expressed similar 
concerns about allowing “ready public access to the names of unconvicted 
accused” in Krushell, noting that: 
[s]tatutorily prescribed punishments for the convicted would pale in many 
cases in comparison to the de facto punishment created by posting [such] 
information… for the benefit of the gossip and the busybody.183
In light of these concerns, the Court rejected an access to information 
request for disclosure of daily court dockets by an applicant who proposed 
to post them on the internet. Additionally, courts in BC and Alberta have 
chosen not to post certain kinds of decisions on their websites, such as 
those relating to family law, child protection and divorce,184 and, as noted 
above, family court records are not publicly accessible on BC’s CSO.
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) has also 
issued access guidelines for federal tribunals governed by the Privacy Act185 
with respect to addressing the privacy/vulnerability cycle aggravated by 
181. Memorandum from the Provincial Court of British Columbia (March 
2016) Policy regarding criminal court record information available 
through Court Services Online, at 7, online: Provincial Court BC <www.
provincialcourt.bc.ca/downloads/NewsReleases/Provincial%20Court%20
Post-Consultation%20Memorandum%20-%20CSO%20Criminal%20
Information.pdf>. Non-conviction information has to be removed 
within 30 days of the entry of the acquittal, withdrawal or dismissal.  
Information on stays of proceedings has to be rendered inaccessible 1 
year after entry of the stay.  Information relating to peace bonds has to be 
rendered inaccessible once the bond has expired.
182. Ibid at 3-4. 
183. Alberta (Attorney General of ) v Krushell, 2003 ABQB 252 at para 49 
[emphasis omitted]. 
184. Gary Dickson QC, “Administrative Tribunals, Privacy and the Net” 
(2009) 6:12 Canadian Privacy L Rev 65 at 73, online: Perma <https://
perma.cc/A9L9-59C7>. 
185. RSC 1985, c P-21.
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online access to court records noting:
When personal information is made available on the internet, individuals 
are at greater risk of identity theft, stalkers, data profilers, data miners and 
discriminatory practices; personal information can be taken out of context 
and used in illegitimate ways; and individuals lose control over personal 
information they may well have legitimately expected would be used for only 
limited purposes.186
Additionally, the OPC has questioned whether “the broad public needs 
to know the names of individuals involved or requires access to intimate 
personal details through decisions posted widely on the internet”,187 
expressing the view that “the right to open courts does not outweigh the 
right to privacy” so that both should exist in equilibrium.188 In line with 
these concerns, in 2008, the OPC recommended that Service Canada 
should either depersonalize or post only summaries of the Office of the 
Umpire decisions on the internet, noting that these appeals related to 
personal information about employment insurance.189  
Similarly, the Saskatchewan Information Privacy Commissioner 
(“IPC”) recommended that the Automobile Injury Appeal Commission 
mask the identity of applicants before posting their decisions online.190 
Subsequently, the IPC’s 2004-5 annual report highlighted the connection 
between online disclosure of personal and health information and “such 
186.  Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Guidance Document: 
Electronic Disclosure of Personal Information in the Decisions 
of Administrative Tribunals” (February 2010) at 2, online: OPC 
<publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/priv/IP54-48-2010-eng.
pdf> [emphasis added].
187. Jennifer Stoddart, “Setting the ‘Bar’ on Privacy Protection” (speech 
delivered at the Canadian Bar Association Legal Conference and Expo, 
Quebec City, 17 August 2008), online: OPC <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/
opc-news/speeches/2008/sp-d_080817/>.
188. Canadian Judicial Council, “Synthesis on the Comments on the JTAC’s 
Discussion Paper on Open Courts Electronic Access to Court Records 
and Privacy”, by Lisa Austin & Frederic Pelletier (Ottawa: January 2005) 
at 10, online: CJC <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/ general/news_
pub_techissues_Synthesis_2005_en.pdf>.
189. Dickson, supra note 184 at 66.
190. Ibid at 78.
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problems as identity theft, marketing opportunities, commercial data 
bases, personal safety of victims of domestic violence and stalking”.191 
Ultimately, the Commission adopted a policy of using initials in its 
decisions.192 
In 2005 the Canadian Judicial Council’s Judges Technology Advisory 
Committee issued its Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada.193 
That policy stated that it did not endorse making all court records accessible 
online, and specifically adverted to the privacy/vulnerability cycle, noting 
that “new technologies increase the risks that court information might 
be used for improper purposes such as commercial data mining, identity 
theft, stalking, harassment and discrimination”.194 It recommended, 
among other things, that courts “prohibit the inclusion of unnecessary 
personal data identifiers and other personal information in the court 
record” and that judges avoid disclosure of personal data identifiers and 
limit disclosure of personal information in their judgments.195 It also 
recommended that judgments be made available online, but that steps be 
taken to prevent indexing and cache storage by online bots, so as to avoid 
searchability on general search engines like Google.196
The privacy/vulnerability cycle and the special concerns it raises for 
members of equality-seeking communities in the context of online court 
records is sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, recognized in 
Canadian case law, legislation, court and tribunal rules and procedures, 
as well as in commentary from privacy commissioners and policy makers. 
While explicit reference to the cycle is more likely to surface in the context 
of specific vulnerable populations, including young people and sexual 
assault complainants (who are disproportionately likely to be women), 
191. Ibid.
192. Dickson, supra note 184.
193. Canadian Judicial Council, “Model Policy for Access to Court Records 
in Canada” (Ottawa: Judges Technology Advisory Committee, 2005), 
online: CJC <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_
techissues_AccessPolicy_2005_en.pdf>. 
194. Ibid at iii, vii [emphasis added].
195. Ibid, ss 2.1, 2.3.
196. Ibid, s 4.6.1.
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it is occasionally also implicitly recognized in practices of anonymization 
in relation to decision making about members of other equality-seeking 
communities. These existing, albeit limited, acknowledgments of the 
privacy/vulnerability cycle, combined with concerns about widespread 
online dissemination and increasingly sophisticated data profiling 
techniques, provide a foundation and context ripe for reflecting on the 
relationship between privacy and equality and for developing effective 
measures to intervene in the privacy/vulnerability cycle.
IV. Conclusion  
Although privacy at law has been abused by members of privileged groups 
to the disadvantage of less privileged groups, privacy, properly conceived, 
can also be intimately connected to autonomy, self-determination and 
collective social rights and values, like equality.197 As Calo has argued, 
members of marginalized communities are often accorded less privacy 
and subjected to greater surveillance, which in turn exacerbates their 
exposure to further discrimination and marginalization.198 The justice 
system frequently contributes to this “vicious cycle”, through the over-
representation of members of marginalized communities in court 
proceedings either against their will or in order to contest or seek redress 
for the results of their marginalization. It need not, however, perpetuate 
the “vicious cycle” of privacy and vulnerability when it comes to public 
access to court records. This has been recognized (albeit to a very limited 
degree) in the context of certain vulnerable groups, particularly children 
and sexual assault complainants, as well as in other privacy-based limits 
imposed in relation to litigation.  And it need not, and should not, 
perpetuate that “vicious cycle” in the context of online public access to 
court records.
Calo, in the epigraph, suggests that stronger protections for the 
197. See Jane Bailey, “Towards an Equality-Enhancing Conception of Privacy” 
(2008) 31:2 Dalhousie Law Journal 267.
198. For further discussion of the surveillance/discrimination cycle in relation 
to marginalized populations, see Rachel E Dubrofsky & Shoshana Amielle 
Magnet, Feminist Surveillance Studies (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2015). 
46 
 
Burkell & Bailey, Equity at Stake
chronically vulnerable may be in order. While we agree with the logic 
and moral appeal of this argument, specifying restrictions on online 
access to court records for chronically vulnerable communities raises at 
least three problems. First, identification of the “chronically vulnerable” 
seems to necessitate creation of hierarchies of vulnerability that, in light 
of the multiplicity of matrices of domination at play in the world,199 may 
neither be equality-enhancing or possible to do. Second, the identification 
process would have to be an ongoing one as the sources and grounds 
and intersections of vulnerability due to social location shift and reshape 
themselves. This would inevitably seem to leave certain marginalized 
communities vulnerable and exposed until such time as their plight was 
recognized by the courts and incorporated into some form of privacy-
protective, equality-enhancing measure. Third, as MacDonnell has 
pointed out, automatic “protections” for certain marginalized groups 
could serve to reinforce the stereotypes and discrimination against which 
they are intended to push back200 by uniquely depriving members of 
those groups the autonomy to determine whether they wish to conceal 
that information about themselves.
For these reasons, and recognizing that there is no perfect solution, 
we return to the recommendation we put forward as a result of a 
prior analysis that specifically focused on the privacy issues relating to 
online public access to unredacted court records.201 There we proposed 
maintaining public access to court records in its current form (and subject 
to whatever limitations laws that rein in the open court principle allow), 
while “introducing appropriate ‘friction’ in the process of accessing court 
records” online.202 This could include redacting personal information 
from court records (including anonymizing judgments) before they are 
made accessible online, restricting search visibility and protecting access 
199. See Patricia Hill Collins & Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2016). 
200. MacDonnell, supra note 2 at 144.
201. Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2. 
202. Ibid at 182.
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to documents.203  
We recognize that this response goes further than necessary to 
intervene specifically on the privacy/vulnerability cycle because it 
provides a level of obscurity for both those who are members of equality-
seeking groups and those who are not.  However, it offers two attractive 
outcomes. First, it does not presume that members of certain marginalized 
communities must want to conceal information about themselves because 
it is necessarily stigmatizing or something to be ashamed of. Instead it 
assumes that a certain level of concealment is important to the dignity of 
all persons in the context of easy and widespread access to digital records. 
Second, in making that assumption, it removes the costly onus of 
bringing a motion to displace a presumption of openness in a proceeding 
from the shoulders of a party seeking privacy protection. This aspect of 
our proposed response could be of particular benefit to individuals from 
marginalized communities who are unaware of the possibility of seeking 
such protections and/or who are not in a financial position to press for 
them before a court or tribunal.
203. Ibid at 181, referring to Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D Stutzman, 
“Obscurity by Design” (2013) 88:2 Washington Law Review 385.

